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Abstract
We derive the optimal underwriting method and the quantitative IPO pricing rule
that this method implies in a market with informational frictions consisting of fully
rational banks, issuers, and investors. In an efficient IPO market, an issuer’s expected
initial return will be determined entirely by the combination of this pricing rule and
issuer fundamentals. Applying this rule, we find that we can explain the quantitative
magnitude of the principal aspects of the time-series and cross-sectional variation in
IPO average initial returns. We conclude that the IPO market is efficient.
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, Underwriters, IPO Underpricing, Efficient
Markets Hypothesis
I. Introduction
In the IPO market sophisticated issuers with considerable sums at stake acquire
underwriting services from a large number of capable and highly competitive investment
banks. In such a market, we conjecture that banks will use the optimal underwriting
method to take firms public and that IPO offer prices (and so average initial returns) will
be determined entirely by issuer fundamentals given the pricing rule implied by that
underwriting method. We label this conjecture the Efficient IPO Market Hypothesis
(EIMH). In this paper we develop and test the EIMH.
We begin by deriving the optimal underwriting method in a market with
informational frictions consisting of fully rational banks, issuers, and investors.1 The
1Our analysis builds upon Gondat-Larralde and James (2008).
agency conflict and/or behavioral factors that provide the point of departure for much of
the post-DotCom Boom research on IPOs play no role in our analysis.2 Our analysis yields
a quantitative pricing rule that enables us to compute the numerical value of the average
initial return implied by issuer fundamentals in an efficient IPO market (R
∗
EIM) for a TEST
portfolio of IPOs given the return distribution of a completely independent CONTROL
portfolio of IPOs.3 If our theory is correct, then the observed average initial return on a
TEST portfolio will equal that portfolio’s R
∗
EIM.
We test our theory by seeing if we can resolve the principal average initial return
(R) anomalies in the IPO literature, to wit: i) the high R on IPOs during the DotCom
Boom of 1999/2000; and ii) the high R on Tech IPOs relative to the R on NonTech IPOs
(Loughran and Ritter (2002), Ritter and Welch (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003),
Loughran and Ritter (2004), Kang and Lowery (2014)).4
To carry out this test, we divide our sample along a Tech (TECH) or NonTech
(NTECH) cross-sectional dimension and a Boom (BOOM) or PostBoom (PBOOM)
time-series dimension (where the PostBoom period consists of the years 2001/2016). We
then sort sample IPOs into four TEST portfolios: BOOM/TECH (B/T), BOOM/NTECH
2This recent IPO literature largely follows the agency conflict/behavioral factor path suggested by Ritter
and Welch (2002).
3That is, all of our R
∗
EIM predictions are out of sample predictions.
4For example, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) write that ”it strains belief that even collectively this
body of theory [informational frictions with rational agents] can account for the profound change in market
behavior [during the DotCom boom]”, and Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude their survey by observing that
“we believe that future explanations [of underpricing] will need to concentrate on agency conflicts and share
allocation issues on one hand and behavioral explanations on the other hand...the challenge for such theories
will be to explain the dramatic variations in underpricing”.
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(B/NT), PBOOM/TECH (PB/T), and PBOOM/NTECH (PB/NT). Using PBOOM IPOs
as our CONTROL, we find that R
∗
EIM on B/T IPOs is 75.30% and that R
∗
EIM on B/NT
IPOs is 26.74%. The observed R on these IPOs is 76.74% and 28.55%, respectively. Using
BOOM IPOs as our CONTROL, we find that R
∗
EIM on PB/T IPOs is 20.92% and that
R
∗
EIM on PB/NT IPOs is 10.97%. The observed R on these IPOs is 17.07% and 11.76%
respectively. That is, we find that the combination of the optimal pricing rule we derive for
an efficient IPO market and issuer fundamentals yields precise and accurate predictions for
the quantitative magnitude of both the cross-sectional and time-series variation in Tech
and NonTech IPO average initial returns.
The strong empirical support that we find for the implications of our theory
therefore implies that issuer fundamentals rather than agency conflict and/or behavioral
factors determine IPO offer prices.
We believe that the IPO market functions in the way that it does because of three
key features. First, we assume that an IPO failure is very costly for both a bank and an
issuer and hence that issuers choose between banks that can ensure that their IPO will be
a success.5 Second, in order for an IPO to be a success, a bank must place shares of highly
uncertain value with both potentially informed (Y ) and uninformed (N) investors.6 In
5This strong “No Failure”assumption simplifies our analysis, but we show in Section II.B that weakening
this assumption does not alter our results.
6Our reasoning on this point is as follows: if banks knew that investors were definitely uninformed, then
the optimal method to take a firm public would be to hold a sealed bid auction for the IPO shares. Yet,
Jagannathan, Jirnyi, and Sherman’s (2015) examination of the competition between underwriting methods
in over 50 countries finds that sealed bid auctions never emerge as the dominant underwriting method if
underwriters are free to choose alternatives. It follows that sealed bid auctions are not (in practice) the
optimal underwriting method, and this result in turn implies that at least some investors do potentially
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particular, we assume that a Y investor has the option to lemon-dodge, that is, to expend a
minimal amount of costly effort and avoid participating in an IPO if its share value V is
less than its offer price P . Lemon-dodging therefore enables a Y investor to avoid an IPO’s
downside risk.7 And third, since neither a bank nor an issuer knows the issuer’s offer price
at the time the issuer chooses a bank to take them public, we assume that market value
maximizing banks compete for underwriting mandates on the basis of their expected price
of underwriting services.
A Y investor selected at random to participate in an IPO will always find it
profitable to lemon-dodge as by doing so they can avoid participating in IPOs with a
negative return (even if the bank underprices IPO shares on average). Since a bank’s IPOs
will fail with positive probability if Y investors do lemon-dodge, a bank must devise an
underwriting method such that Y investors choose not to lemon-dodge. We refer to this
requirement as the No Lemon-Dodging Constraint or NLDC.
A bank can successfully deal with the NLDC by block-booking its IPOs (Kenney
and Klein (1983), Gondat-Larralde and James (2008)). A block-booking bank enters into a
repeat game with a stable coalition of Y investors in which the bank: i) underprices its
IPO shares on average; ii) preferentially selects coalition investors to participate in its
IPOs; and iii) ejects any investor who does lemon-dodge from its coalition.8 The
possess private information.
7An IPO’s downside risk equals the absolute value of its expected return setting all positive return
realizations to 0.
8Our assumption that banks enter into a repeat game with a coalition of investors is consistent with the
empirical findings on IPO share allocation by Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Gondat-Larralde and James
(2008), Grullon, Underwood, and Weston (2014), Brown and Kovbasyuk (2016), Krigman and Jeffus (2016),
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combination of on-average underpricing and preferential selection creates a profit stream
for an investor the bank invites into its coalition, and a coalition investor who chooses to
lemon-dodge loses this profit stream. The bank then sets offer prices such that an investor
finds coalition membership (and so purchasing IPO shares at the offer price without
lemon-dodging) more profitable than lemon-dodging once.
To derive the pricing rule that block-booking implies, we begin by positing that
issuers choose between banks on the basis of a bank’s expected price of underwriting
services per $1 of expected market value sold in the IPO. A bank’s expected price of
underwriting services equals the sum of expected fees and expected underpricing. A bank
can therefore split the equilibrium price of its services between fees and underpricing as it
chooses without affecting the probability that it wins a mandate.
Given that a bank collects all of the fees but must share the money that
underpricing leaves on the table with investors (Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett (2011)), a
block-booking bank will choose the maximum expected offer price for its IPOs consistent
with satisfying the NLDC. In other words, a bank minimizes expected underpricing to the
extent possible so as to maximize income from fees given an equilibrium expected price of
underwriting services. An IPO’s fundamental offer price is therefore the offer price implied
by this condition.
Expected offer price maximization subject to the NLDC implies that a bank sets
offer prices to equalize downside risk across its offerings. To see why, suppose that offer
prices in all future periods are fixed and consider the offer price a bank will choose for a
given IPO in the current period. If a bank block-books, then the profit a coalition investor
and Jenkinson, Jones, and Suntheim (2017).
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expects to obtain by remaining in the bank’s coalition (coalition profit) is independent of
the profit they expect to obtain by lemon-dodging on the current IPO (lemon-dodging
profit). But, lemon-dodging profit on the current IPO increase as that IPO’s offer price
increases (or, in other words, an IPO’s downside risk increases with its offer price). So, a
bank will increase the current IPO’s offer price to the point where a Y investor’s
lemon-dodging profit on that IPO given that offer price just equals the fixed coalition
profit. Since lemon-dodging profit is equal to IPO’s downside risk, the downside risk on the
current IPO given its offer price must equal this fixed coalition profit for any IPO the bank
underwrities. It follows that a bank sets offer prices to equalize downside risk across its
IPOs.
If banks do set offer prices to equalize downside risk across their offerings, then we
can compute R
∗
EIM on a TEST portfolio as follows. We first estimate the equilibrium level
of downside risk from a completely independent CONTROL portfolio. Then, we adjust
TEST IPO offer prices by a scalar until the downside risk on TEST IPOs given those
adjusted offer prices equals the equilibrium level of downside risk. The average initial
return on TEST IPOs in an efficient market is then the average initial return on those
IPOs calculated with these adjusted offer prices. We therefore test our theory by seeing if
the R
∗
EIM we compute for a portfolio of TEST IPOs is equal to the observed average initial
return on those IPOs.
While we focus on explaining the cross-sectional and time-series variation in
underpricing for IPO types, our analysis also leads to a reinterpretation of two other key
aspects of the IPO market, namely: i) the within type cross-sectional variation in R known
as the Partial-Adjustment Effect ((Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Hanley (1993)); and
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ii) investor kickbacks (Loughran and Ritter (2002, 2004), Reuter (2006), Nimalendran,
Ritter, and Zhang (2007), and Goldstein et al. (2011)). Consider each in turn.
The Partial-Adjustment Effect refers to the following empirical pattern. If the IPO
process generates bad news about an IPO’s value, the bank lowers that IPO’s offer price
(relative to its initial offer price estimate) to the point where the IPO’s expected initial
return is positive but small; on the other hand, if the IPO process generates good news
about an IPO’s value, the bank raises that IPO’s offer price but only to a point where the
expected return on that IPO is positive and large. It therefore appears that the offer price
of an IPO only partially reacts to any good news that the IPO process generates.
In our model, this empirical pattern arises as follows: i) each IPO type consists of a
low value β isotype and a high value α isotype; ii) issuers have MaxiMin preferences; and
iii) banks set offer prices to equalize downside risk across IPO types (not isotypes). Banks
therefore set β IPO offer prices at their maximum feasible level and set α IPO offer prices
at the level that brings about downside risk equalization across IPO types. It follows that
β IPO offer prices are higher and α IPO offer prices are lower than they would be if banks
set offer prices to equalize downside risk across each isotype independently.
Crucially, though, one must measure the magnitude of these MaxiMin effects by
comparing the observed R on α or β IPOs to what it would have been if downside risk
equalization held for each isotype independently (rather than for the IPO type as a whole)
and not by comparing the R on α IPOs to that on β IPOs. We show in the Appendix that:
i) the MaxiMin effect does lead to an increase in β IPO offer prices during the Boom,
causing R on these IPOs to fall by between 10.28% and 14.55%; and that ii) the MaxiMin
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effect is near zero for α IPOs during the Boom and for all IPOs in the PostBoom period.9
So, the magnitude of the R on α IPOs is not due to α IPO offer prices only partially
adjusting to their full standalone equilibrium value.
In common with the agency conflict approach to the IPO market, we assume that
banks profit by collecting spreads from issuers and (effectively) kickbacks from investors
who compensate the bank in some way in exchange for being invited to purchase
on-average underpriced IPO shares. Our theory implies that, in the case of coalition
investors, the money that underpricing appears to leave on the table is just sufficient to
ensure that block-booking works. Consequently, our analysis predicts that coalition
investors will not pay kickbacks to the banks that invite them to participate in an offering.
In the case of non-coalition investors, on the other hand, the money that underpricing
appears to leave on the table really is money left on the table. Our analysis therefore
predicts that these investors will pay kickbacks.
Consistent with these predictions, Goldstein et al.’s (2011) thorough investigation of
investor kickbacks finds that: i) coalition (or, in their terminology, regular) investors do not
pay kickbacks; and that ii) non-coalition (or, in their terminology, transitory) investors do
pay kickbacks. In other words, banks do not underprice IPOs in order to collect kickbacks,
they collect kickbacks (from non-coalition investors) because they must underprice IPOs.10
9Since α IPOs outnumber β IPOs by a considerable margin, the increase on β IPO offer prices during
the Boom entails only a very small decrease on α IPO offer prices.
10If banks can collect kickbacks from non-coalition investors when bringing a firm public, then the profit
a bank obtains by winning a mandate increases. Hence, banks will compete more intensely to win mandates,
and this more intense competition will in turn lead to lower underwriting fees. It follows that a regime in
which banks could not collect kickbacks from non-coalition investors would increase the price of underwriting
9
We note one caveat that arises from our assumption that banks are homogeneous.
We show empirically that this assumption holds along the underwriter prestige dimension
(Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), Loughran and Ritter
(2004)). That is, we find that high prestige and low prestige underwriters use the same
pricing rule. But, our equilibrium does depend upon a repeat game mechanism, and so one
might naturally expect to find that high volume banks have a considerable competitive
advantage over low volume banks. However, we find in unreported analysis that high
volume and low volume banks also use the same pricing rule. This result is a puzzle given
our model as it stands, and we therefore plan to explore competition between heterogenous
banks in future work.
Previous Literature
Our analysis belongs to the rational agent/informational frictions branch of the IPO
literature. As in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), we
posit that banks use a repeat game mechanism to overcome informational frictions. We
build upon Kenney and Klein’s (1983) general analysis of block-booking and the
application of the block-booking idea to the IPO market by Gondat-Larralde and James
(2008). Gondat-Larralde and James examine the case of a single bank underwriting an
exogenous stream of IPOs and find that the bank can maximize IPO proceeds by setting
offer prices to equalize downside risk across its offerings. We extend Gondat-Larralde and
James’ analysis by deriving the full market equilibrium with competing banks and
services for issuers.
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endogenous spreads, offer prices, and investor kickbacks.
The rational agent/informational frictions approach to analyzing the IPO market
has fallen out of favor due to its inability to provide an adequate explanation for the
time-series and cross-sectional variation in IPO average initial returns. Consequently, most
of the PostBoom literature has looked to non-fundamental factors such as agency conflicts
and behavioral biases to explain this variation. We cite the principal papers in this agency
conflict/behavioral bias branch of the literature above.
We completely agree with the idea that it may be useful to explore the possible role
that agency conflicts and/or behavioral biases play in determining IPO offer prices if one
finds a significant gap between observed average initial returns and those implied by issuer
fundamentals. Our disagreement with the agency conflict/behavioral bias literature arises
from our different approaches to calculating R
∗
EIM. We derive an IPO pricing rule that
enables us to accurately compute R
∗
EIM. The agency conflict/behavioral bias papers instead
estimate R
∗
EIM using reduced form pricing rules based on issuer characteristics.
11 Our
analysis suggests that these reduced form pricing rules do not adequately proxy for the
downside risk equalization pricing rule we derive and so produce a large apparent gap
between observed average initial returns and R
∗
EIM where (at least according to our
analysis) no such gap exists.
We organize our analysis as follows. In Section II we derive the optimal
underwriting method in an efficient IPO market. In Section III we derive an empirical test
for our conjecture that IPO offer prices are determined by issuer fundamentals given the
11Butler, Keefe, and Kieschnick (2014) identify 48 issuer characteristics (selected on largely atheoretical
grounds) that have been used (in various combinations) in these reduced form pricing rules.
11
optimal underwriting method. In Section IV we describe the IPO sample we use for our
analysis. We carry out our empirical tests in Section V and we present our conclusions in
Section VI. We include an appendix with additional material on the market equilibrium,
our empirical approach, and the MaxiMin effect.
II. IPO Pricing in an Efficient Market
We analyze a bank’s choice of underwriting method in a market with informational
frictions consisting of fully rational banks, issuers, and investors. We: i) describe our
set-up; ii) derive a bank’s optimal pricing rule, investor kickback rates, gross spread, and
share allocation method given a market equilibrium; and iii) show that the market
equilibrium exists and examine the empirical implications of that equilibrium.
A. Set-Up and Assumptions
The market consists of QU identical banks, type Y and N investors, and issuers. An
issuer is of type τ and variety η, with η ∈ {α, β}. We refer to a τ/η combination as an
isotype.
1. Timing
In period t0 each bank u simultaneously specifies: i) a gross spread Su; ii) a kickback
rate κY,u and κN,u for each investor type; and iii) an offer price for each IPO isotype Pτ,η,u.
In each period t, t ≥ t1, an issuer undertakes an IPO. The IPO process consists of
the following actions:
12
a1: the issuer chooses a bank to take their firm public;
a2: the bank and investors can observe the issuer’s type and its initial expected offer
price of Pτ,u;
a3: the bank invites specific investors it chooses into the pool of eligible investors in
exchange for a kickback (which can be 0);
a4: Y investors in the investor pool decide whether or not to acquire private
information on the issuer’s value;
a5: the IPO process reveals the issuer’s variety η;
a6: the bank sets the issuer’s offer price as a function of its type and variety;
a7: the bank makes the eligible investors a take it or leave it offer to purchase IPO
shares at the offer price;
a8: all investors decide whether or not they wish to participate given the firm’s type,
variety, offer price, and their information on its market value; and
a9: if the investors do choose to participate then the IPO succeeds and if they do not
the IPO fails.12 If the IPO is a success, trading begins and reveals the market value
V of the issuer’s shares.
12Though we do not model it here, allowing an issuer to withdraw its IPO at anytime before the bank
sets the issuer’s offer price and offers shares to investors would not affect our analysis.
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2. Issuers
Each issuing firm consists of a single project with an expected value of $1 and a
single infinitely divisible share (that is, an offer price in our analysis is the offer price per
expected dollar of market value). An issuer is of type τ with probability φτ ,
τ = {1, . . . , T }, with
∑
τ φτ = 1. For each IPO type, proportion στ,η are of variety η, with
η ∈ {α, β} and with στ,α + στ,β = 1. The market value of the t
th period issuer is V ∗τ,η,t,
which is an iid realization of random variable Vτ,η (we use an “*”to denote the optimal
value of a choice variable or a specific value of a non-choice variable). Each Vτ,η distribution
has the following properties (which are common knowledge): i) Vτ,η is continuously
distributed on {0,∞}; ii) E
[
Vτ,η
]
= V τ,η; iii) V τ,α > V τ,β; and iv)Vτ,η ∼ Ψτ,η (pdf: ψτ,η).
Since a variety α project has a higher expected market value than a variety β
project for a given IPO type, it is good news for an issuer if the offering process reveals
that a project is of variety α. We assume that P ∗τ,α,u > V τ,β,u ≥ P
∗
τ,β,u, where P
∗
τ,η,u is the
equilibrium offer price on a τ/η IPO.
We assume that an IPO failure is very costly for issuers and that issuers can
attempt to go public just once. We further assume that issuers have MaxiMin preferences
and so seek to maximize the minimum amount they raise from their IPO. Consequently,
issuers choose a bank from the set of banks with an underwriting method that: i) ensures
that the bank’s IPOs succeed; and ii) produces offer prices such that Pτ,β,u equals its
maximum feasible value for all τ . We refer to underwriting methods with these properties
as valid methods.
From the set of banks with valid underwriting methods, the probability that an
14
issuer chooses a given bank z is a function of z’s relative price of underwriting services. If
all banks with valid underwriting methods have the same price of underwriting services,
then an issuer chooses at random between them.
3. Investors
Each investor acts to maximize their profit, and each investor invests a constant
amount of one unit in each IPO in which they participate. An investor is either potentially
informed (type Y ) or uninformed (type N). We refer to investors generically with an ι
subscript. We assume that a bank must place a proportion σY (σN) of the shares of each
IPO with Y (N) investors, with σY + σN = 1. Investors cannot act strategically (e.g.,
coordinate their actions to form a buyer cartel).
Individual investors are identifiable and their type is observable, and all investors
are identical in all respects except their access to private information on an IPO’s value. In
particular, all investors are risk-neutral and have a discount parameter of γι, and all
investors can observe an IPO’s type in a2 and its variety in a5. Investors only participate in
an offering if they expect a non-negative return.
In addition, a Y investor has the option to expend a minimal amount of costly effort
in a4 to put themselves into a position to know if Vτ,η,t < Pτ,η,u in a8 (that is, at the point
when they make their participation decision). We refer to this behavior as lemon-dodging,
and we assume that an investor’s decision to lemon-dodge is observable by the bank in
a9.
13 A lemon-dodging investor declines to participate in an IPO if they find that Vτ,η,t is
13As an investor’s decision to decline to participate is observable, assuming that the bank can observe an
investor’s decision to lemon-dodge directly simplifies our analysis but does not change our results.
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less than Pτ,η,u (if an investor would instead choose to participate in these circumstances,
they do not lemon-dodge in the first place).
Given that Vτ,η is distributed on {0,∞}, an IPO will fail with positive probability if
Y investors choose to lemon-dodge. Since the bank must place IPO shares with Y investors
in order for an IPO to succeed, the bank must design an underwriting method such that Y
investors choose not to lemon-dodge. We refer to this requirement as the No
Lemon-Dodging Constraint or the NLDC.
A bank must also place shares with N investors. An N investor has no private
information on an IPO’s value and will only participate if they expect to obtain a
non-negative return. It follows that a bank must set offer prices such that Pτ,η ≤ V τ,η.
If Y investors do not lemon-dodge, then neither the investors nor the bank has any
private information on an issuer’s market value. Hence, the maximum feasible offer price
on a β IPO is V τ,η. Since banks must set the offer price of a β IPO at the maximum
feasible level, each bank chooses optimal offer prices P ∗τ,α,u and P
∗
τ,β,u such that
(1) P ∗τ,α,u ≤ V τ,α and P
∗
τ,β,u ≈ V τ,β ∀ τ.
We refer to equation (1) as the Pricing Constraint.14 A valid underwriting method is one
that satisfies both the NLDC and the Pricing Constraint.
14Empirically, banks do slightly underprice β IPOs on average (R on these IPOs is about 4%). In common
with the rest of the literature on the partial-adjustment effect, we do not model the determinants of this
element of underpricing. We conjecture that banks must in practice offer N investors a small positive
expected return in order to induce them to participate rather than simply a non-negative return. In our
empirical analysis we assume that the fundamental offer price on a β IPO is equal to its observed offer price.
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4. Banks
Each risk neutral bank u, u = 1 . . . U , devises a valid underwriting method and
chooses: i) a set of offer prices ~Pu, with ~Pu =
{
P1,α,u, P
∗
1,β,u, . . . , PT ,α,u, P
∗
T ,β,u
}
; ii) a gross
spread Su; and iii) kickback rates κY,u and κN,u in t0 to maximize its t0 market value Mu,
with
(2) Mu =
∑
t
γtu φw,u,t πu,
where γu is the bank discount parameter (which is the same for all banks), φw,u,t is the
probability that the bank wins an underwriting mandate in period t, and πu is the
expected profit a bank obtains given that it wins a mandate. Each bank acts in a purely
intermediary capacity and cannot make side-payments to either investors or issuers. We
assume that a bank does not incur any direct costs when underwriting an issuer.
A bank obtains profit by collecting gross spreads from issuers and kickbacks from
investors. Consider each revenue stream in turn.
Each bank chooses a gross spread Su in t0 and so obtains Su Pτ,η,u in fee income for
each issuer it takes public.
A bank can require that investors who wish to participate in the offering kickback a
proportion of the expected money that underpricing leaves on the table to the bank before
the bank includes them in the eligible investor pool. The expected amount of money that
underpricing leaves on the table for a τ IPO is λτ,u, with
λτ,u = V τ,u − Pτ,u.
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Pτ,u is the expected offer price on a τ IPO, with
Pτ,u = στ,α Pτ,α,u + στ,β Pτ,β,u.
A bank’s kickback rate for investors of type ι equals κι,u, with 0 ≤ κι,u ≤ κMAX < 1. A
bank therefore obtains Kτ,u in kickbacks given that it is underwriting a τ IPO, with
Kτ,u = (σY κY,u + σN κN,u)λτ,u < λτ,u.
Combining revenue from fees and kickbacks, a bank expects to obtain a profit of
πτ,u when underwriting a τ IPO, with
πτ,u = Su Pτ,u + (σY κY,u + σN κN,u)λτ,u.
Since an issuer must choose an underwriter before either the issuer or the underwriter
knows its type, the probability that a mandate that a bank wins is of type τ is just equal
to the probability that an issuer is of type τ . It follows that
(3) πu =
∑
τ
φτ πτ,u = Su P u + (σY κY,u + σN κN,u)λu,
where
P u =
∑
τ
φτ Pτ,u,
V u =
∑
τ
φτ V τ,u,
18
and
λu =
∑
τ
φτ λτ,u = V u − P u.
A bank’s expected price of underwriting services is then ωu, with
(4) ωu = Su P u + λu.
We assume that the market reaches a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each
bank j chooses its equilibrium price of underwriting services ω∗j such that
(5) ω∗j = Ω
∗ ∀ j,
where Ω∗ is the market equilibrium price of underwriting services.
B. The IPO Market with Block-Booking Banks
In this section we assume that the market is in equilibrium and examine an
individual bank’s choice of underwriting method.
If the market is in equilibrium, then ωu = Ω
∗. In this case a bank’s probability of
winning a mandate in each period is 1/QU and the probability that a mandate the bank
wins is of type τ equals the probability that an issuer is of type τ (φτ ). A bank’s task is to
choose the valid underwriting method that maximizes its market value given Ω∗ and this
flow of IPOs.
Given that ω = Ω∗, a bank can split its price of underwriting services between
expected fees and expected underpricing as it wishes without affecting the probability that
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it wins a mandate (since we are dealing with a single bank, we will generally drop the bank
index u in our exposition). So, we begin our analysis of a bank’s choice of underwriting
method by examining how it chooses between spreads and kickbacks.
Proposition 1 Within the constraints imposed by its choice of a valid underwriting
method, a bank maximizes the expected offer price (minimizes expected underpricing) of its
IPOs so as to maximize expected fees.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, this result follows from the fact that while issuers are indifferent between
a dollar of fees and a dollar of underpricing, a bank keeps all of the underwriting fees but it
must share the money that underpricing leaves on the table with investors. A bank
therefore sets offer prices to maximize P subject to the constraints imposed by its choice of
valid underwriting method.
We conjecture that the valid underwriting method a bank chooses is block-booking.
We now examine the pricing constraints that this choice imposes.
Proposition 2 Block-booking is a valid underwriting method. A block-booking bank: i)
underprices its IPOs on average; ii) allocates IPO shares by entering into a repeat game
with a coalition of Y investors and by selecting N investors at random; iii) sets the Y
investor kickback rate to 0; and iv) sets the N investor kickback rate to its maximum
possible value κMAX.
To be valid, a bank’s underwriting method must enable it to successfully place
shares of each IPO type with both Y and N investors. Consider each investor type in turn.
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To successfully place shares with Y investors, a bank must devise an underwriting
method such that Y investors choose to purchase IPO shares at the offer price for each IPO
type (which we refer to as buying sight-unseen) rather than lemon-dodge.
A Y investor makes the buy sight-unseen/lemon-dodge decision knowing an IPO’s
type but not its isotype and after paying a kickback (if any) to be included in the investor
pool. So, at the decision point, a Y investor who buys sight-unseen expects to obtain a
profit of πY,τ,SU, with
(6) πY,τ,SU = σα πY,τ,α,SU + σβ πY,τ,β,SU,
where
(7)
πY,τ,η,SU =
1
Pτ,η
∫
∞
0
(Vτ,η − Pτ,η)ψτ,η dV
=
∫
∞
0
Vτ,η − Pτ,η
Pτ,η
ψτ,η dV = Rτ,η,
and where R is an IPOs expected initial return. It is useful to express πY,τ,η,SU (and so R)
as a combination of downside risk δ and upside risk υ, with
(8) πY,τ,η,SU
[
Pτ,η
]
= −δτ,η
[
Pτ,η
]
+ υτ,η
[
Pτ,η
]
,
where
(9) δτ,η
[
Pτ,η
]
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ Pτ,η
0
Vτ,η − Pτ,η
Pτ,η
ψτ,η dV
∣∣∣∣∣
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and
(10) υτ,η
[
Pτ,η
]
=
∫
∞
Pτ
Vτ,η − Pτ,η
Pτ,η
ψτ,η dV.
We note that ∂δ
∂P
> 0. It follows that
(11)
πY,τ,SU = −(σα δτ,α + σβ δτ,β) + (σα υτ,α + σβ υτ,β)
= −δτ
[
Pτ,α, P
∗
τ,β
]
+ υτ
[
Pτ,α, P
∗
τ,β
]
.
If an investor lemon-dodges, they avoid participating if Vτ,η,t < Pτ,η. Consequently, a
lemon-dodging investor avoids an IPO’s downside risk and so obtains an expected profit of
πY,τ,L, where
(12) πY,τ,L = υτ .
Obviously,
(13) πY,τ,L = υτ > −δτ + υτ = πY,τ,SU.
Equation (13) implies that a Y investor selected at random will always choose to
lemon-dodge for any offer price the bank sets and hence that a bank cannot eliminate
lemon-dodging by simply underpricing its shares.
A bank can eliminate lemon-dodging by block-booking its IPOs. To do so, a bank
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enters into a repeat game with a coalition of Qχ Y investors in which: i) the coalition
investors agree to buy sight-unseen rather than to lemon-dodge; and ii) the bank makes
coalition membership valuable by underpricing its IPO shares on average and selecting its
Y investors from its coalition. To enforce this arrangement, the bank ejects any investor
who does lemon-dodge from its coalition. The bank then sets offer prices such that a
coalition investor finds that the profits of the block-booking arrangement (πY,τ,BB) exceeds
the profits of lemon-dodging once.
The profit a Y investor expects to obtain by participating in the bank’s
block-booking arrangement equals the sum of the profit the investor obtains by buying the
current IPO sight-unseen and the expected coalition profits of πY,χ that follow from
participating in on-average underpriced IPOs in the future. So,
(14) πY,τ,BB = πY,τ,SU + πY,χ.
We assume that a bank picks the optimal number of investors to form its
coalition,15 that it selects investors at random from its coalition for each IPO it
underwrites, and that each investor invests 1 unit in each IPO in which they participate.16
15Coalition management is not the focus of our analysis here, and we abstract from such issues by assuming
that investors cannot act strategically. However, we would expect banks to build some redundancy into their
coalitions so that, for example, no one investor is in a position to obstruct an IPO’s success by refusing to
participate at the last minute.
16That is, the analysis below is done on a per-unit of investment basis, and for convenience we assume
that each investor invests one unit in each IPO in which they participate. Merging investors together (so
that one investor invests multiple units) would not change any of the results.
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Hence, each coalition investor expects a coalition profit of
(15) πY,χ =
1
Qχ
1
QU
∑
t
γtι (1− κY ) (V − P ) = σχ (1− κY ) (V − P ),
where σχ = 1/Qχ 1/QU 1/(1−γι).
An investor will refrain from lemon-dodging if the profit they obtain by remaining
in the bank’s coalition exceeds the profit of lemon-dodging once. We can therefore write
the NLDC as
(16) πY,τ,BB ≥ υτ = πY,τ,L,
implying that (from equations (14) and (15))
(17) P ≤ V −
1
σχ
1
1− κY
δτ .
Given that the bank acts to maximize P , it follows that equation (17) will be binding and
that the bank will set κY = 0 (that is, it does not make sense to underprice by more than
necessary to get block-booking to work and then collect only a portion of that extra
underpricing back in the form of investor kickbacks). As equation (17) must hold for all
IPO types, we can simplify the NLDC to
(18) P ≤ V −
Max
[
~δ
]
σχ
where ~δ =
{
δ1
[
P1,α, P
∗
1,β
]
, . . . , δT
[
PT ,α, P
∗
T ,β
]}
.
24
The fact that a bank underprices its IPO shares on average follows immediately
from the NLDC. If Pτ,η > 0 for any IPO type, then δτ > 0 and so Max
[
~δ
]
> 0, implying
that P < V .
A bank must also place shares with N investors who cannot lemon-dodge. If a bank
block-books, then all N investors know that Y investors do not lemon-dodge and hence
that E
[
Vτ,η,t
]
= V τ,η. It follows that an N investor selected at random will participate if
(19) πN,τ,η =
1
Pτ,η
(V τ,η − Pτ,η) (1− κN) ≥ 0.
Since a bank must set offer prices such that Pτ,η ≤ V τ,η and since κN ≤ κMAX < 1, equation
(19) holds for any possible value of κN and any feasible set of offer prices. Since a bank’s
profits obviously increase as kickbacks increase, a bank allocates IPO shares to N investors
by selecting them at random and setting κN = κMAX.
So, a block-booking bank can successfully place shares of all IPO types with both Y
and N investors. Block-booking is therefore a valid underwriting method.
A block-booking bank chooses the pricing rule that maximizes P subject to
satisfying the NLDC. We now derive that pricing rule.
Proposition 3 A block-booking bank sets offer prices to equalize downside risk across its
IPOs. The combination of block-booking and the downside risk equalization pricing rule
maximizes bank market value, implying that block-booking is the optimal underwriting
method.
In line with the intuition we discuss in the Introduction, suppose that a bank does
set offer prices such that δτ = δDRE for all τ (where DRE stands for Downside Risk
Equalization). In this case, we can rewrite the NLDC as
(20) P [δDRE] ≤ V −
δDRE
σχ
.
Obviously, the left side of equation (20) increases and the right side decreases as δ
increases. It follows that there exists a maximum feasible value of δ, which we denote by
δ∗DRE, such that P
[
δ∗DRE
]
= V − δ∗DRE/σχ, with 0 < P
[
δ∗DRE
]
< V . Denote this value of P by
P ∗DRE and the implied Pτ,α for each IPO type by P
∗
τ,α,DRE.
Now consider any alternative set of offer prices
{
P1,α,ALT, . . . , PT ,α,ALT
}
such that
PALT =
∑
τ
φτ (στ,α Pτ,α,ALT + στ,β P
∗
τ,β) ≥ P
∗
DRE.
If PALT ≥ P
∗
DRE, then there must exist at least one IPO type j such that
Pj,α,ALT > P
∗
j,α,DRE. Consequently, δj
[
Pj,α,ALT
]
> δ∗DRE (given that
P ∗τ,β,DRE = Pτ,β,ALT = V τ,β due to the Pricing Constraint). But, these relationships and
equations (18) and (20) then imply that
(21) PALT ≥ P
∗
DRE = V −
δ∗DRE
σχ
> V −
δj,ALT
σχ
.
That is, there does not exist any alternative set offer prices ~PALT such that PALT ≥ P
∗
DRE
and that prevent Y investors from lemon-dodging. Consequently, the combination of
block-booking and the downside risk equalization pricing rule produces the highest
expected offer price that also satisfies the NLDC. Since a bank’s underwriting method must
satisfy the NLDC (as we model the IPO market) and a bank’s market value increases with
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P , it follows that the block-booking/downside risk equalization pricing rule maximizes
bank market value and hence that block-booking is the optimal underwriting method.
Our proof that the downside risk equalization pricing rule is optimal rests upon the
assumption that issuers choose between banks that can guarantee IPO success. While this
assumption does simplify our analysis, the downside risk equalization rule is in fact optimal
unless issuers and banks would be willing to tolerate a significant failure risk. To see why,
note that the period t IPO will succeed with certainty if a bank block-books and if
Pτ,α,t ≤ P
∗
τ,α. But, if an issuer insists upon an offer price of P
∗
τ,α + ǫ, then Y investors will
lemon-dodge rather than buy sight-unseen. In this case the probability of an IPO failure
increases discontinuously to PROB[Fail], with
(22) PROB [Fail] = στ,α PROB
[
Vτ,α < P
∗
τ,α
]
+ στ,β PROB
[
Vτ,β < P
∗
τ,β
]
> 0.
That is, issuers do not face a continuous trade-off between offer price and IPO failure
probability (where one could imagine different issuers picking different offer price/failure
probability combinations). Instead, issuers must choose between the block-booking offer
price/guaranteed IPO success combination or a slightly higher offer price/substantial risk
of IPO failure combination. Market behavior suggests that issuers prefer the block-booking
option.
Proposition 4 The block-booking pricing rule (given issuer preferences) determines a
unique optimal offer price for each isotype P ∗τ,η and unique optimal gross spread S
∗.
We assume that issuer MaxiMin preferences lead a block-booking bank to set β IPO
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offer prices at their maximum feasible value, implying that
P ∗τ,β = V τ,β ∀ τ.
A bank therefore sets Pτ,α to ensure that δτ = δ
∗
DRE. Recalling that
δτ = στ,α δτ,α
[
Pτ,α
]
+ στ,β δτ,β
[
P ∗τ,β
]
,
it follows that
(23) P ∗τ,α = Pτ,α : δτ,α
[
Pτ,α
]
=
δ∗DRE − στ,β δτ,β
[
P ∗τ,β
]
στ,α
.
A bank’s price of underwriting services Ω equals the sum of expected fees (S P ) and
the money it leaves on the table due to underpricing (V − P ) (equation (4)). Assuming
that the market is in equilibrium, we find that
Ω∗ = S P
∗
DRE + (V − P
∗
DRE).
Solving for the equilibrium value of S yields
(24) S∗ =
Ω∗ − (V − P
∗
DRE)
P
∗
DRE
.
Proposition 4 completes our analysis of IPO pricing, kickbacks, spreads, and share
allocation for a block-booking bank given a market equilibrium price of underwriting
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services.
C. The Market Equilibrium
We now establish that the market equilibrium exists and derive the key properties
of that equilibrium.
Proposition 5 A market equilibrium price of underwriting services exist.
Proof: See Appendix.
In this equilibrium we find that:
Proposition 6 The downside risk of an IPO of type τ underwritten by a bank u will equal
the market equilibrium level of downside risk ∆∗ for all IPO types and all banks. This
result and the Pricing Constraint then enable us to derive the fundamental offer price
(given that banks block-book) on τ/α IPOs of P ∗τ,α,EIM and the fundamental offer price on
τ/β IPOs of P ∗τ,β,EIM. The expected initial return on τ IPOs of R
∗
τ,EIM in an efficient IPO
market equals the expected initial return on those IPOs given that offer prices equal
fundamental offer prices.
Given that a market equilibrium price of underwriting services exists, that all banks
are identical, and that banks compete for underwriting mandates on the basis of their
expected price of underwriting services, it follows that all banks choose the same offer price
for each isotype: that is,
P ∗τ,η,j = P
∗
τ,η,k
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for all IPO isotypes {τ, η} and all banks {j, k}. Consequently, we shall now drop the bank
index from offer price expressions.
The combination of downside risk equalization across IPO types for a given bank
and offer price equalization for a given IPO isotype across banks then implies that
(25) δg,j
[
P ∗g,α, P
∗
g,β
]
= δh,k
[
P ∗h,α, P
∗
h,β
]
= δ∗DRE,j = δ
∗
DRE,k = ∆
∗
for all IPO types {g, h} and all banks {j, k} and that
(26) δτ,η,j
[
P ∗τ,η,j
]
= δτ,η,k
[
P ∗τ,η,k
]
= ∆∗τ,η
for all IPO types τ and all banks {j, k}, where ∆∗ (∆∗τ,η) is the market equilibrium level of
downside risk on an IPO type (a τ/η isotype).
We wish to find fundamental offer price P ∗τ,η,EIM for each IPO isotype. To begin, the
Pricing Constraint implies that
(27) P ∗τ,β,EIM = V τ,β ∀ τ.
Equations (25) and (26) then imply that we can pool together all τ IPOs and rewrite the
equation that defines the optimal offer price on a {τ, α} IPO at a given bank (equation
(23)) on a market-wide basis, yielding
(28) P ∗τ,α,EIM = Pτ,α : ∆τ,α
[
Pτ,α
]
=
∆∗ − στ,β ∆
∗
τ,β
στ,α
.
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Obviously,
(29) R
∗
τ,EIM = Rτ
[
P ∗τ,α,EIM, P
∗
τ,β,EIM
]
.
Equations (28) and (29) provide the foundation for our empirical test of the EIMH.
We now develop that test.
III. Testing the EIMH: Method
If the IPO market is efficient and issuer fundamentals do determine IPO offer prices,
then it will be the case that
Rτ,EIM
[
P ∗τ,α,EIM, P
∗
τ,β,EIM
]
= Rτ,O
[
P ∗τ,α,O, P
∗
τ,β,O
]
,
where Rτ,O is the observed average initial return on τ IPOs and P
∗
τ,η,O is the observed offer
price on {τ, η} IPOs. So, we propose to test the EIMH by: i) forming portfolios of TEST
IPOs; ii) estimating R
∗
TEST,EIM; and iii) seeing if
(30)
∣∣∣∣RTEST,EIM
[
P ∗TEST,α,EIM, P
∗
TEST,β,EIM
]
−R
∗
TEST,O
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ,
where ǫ is a small number.
Suppose that we are estimating R
∗
TEST,EIM with a sample consisting of:
• A TEST/α IPOs, numbered a = 1 . . . A;
• B TEST/β IPOs, numbered b = 1 . . . B; and
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• C CONTROL IPOs, numbered c = 1 . . . C.
We take our sample of TEST IPOs as fixed and we assume that we measure the market
equilibrium level of downside risk with noise. As uncertainty over the market equilibrium
level of downside risk will lead to a noisy estimate of R
∗
TEST,EIM, we calculate both a point
estimate and a confidence interval for R
∗
TEST,EIM.
Noting that
(31) R
∗
TEST,EIM = σ
∗
TEST,αR
∗
TEST,α,EIM + σ
∗
TEST,β R
∗
TEST,β,EIM,
we estimate R
∗
TEST,EIM by estimating each parameter in equation (31).
To begin, we set σ∗TEST,α and σ
∗
TEST,β equal to their sample values, implying that
σ∗TEST,α = σ
∗
TEST,α,O =
A
A+B
and σ∗TEST,β = σ
∗
TEST,β,O =
B
A+B
.
Now consider R
∗
TEST,β,EIM. We assume that banks set β IPO offer prices at their maximum
feasible value, and hence that a β IPO’s fundamental offer price equals its observed offer
price. It follows that
R
∗
TEST,β,EIM = R
∗
TEST,β,O.
The last term of equation (31) is R
∗
TEST,α,EIM, where
(32) R
∗
TEST,α,EIM =
1
A
A∑
1
V ∗TEST,a − P
∗
TEST,a,EIM
P ∗TEST,a,EIM
.
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We define P ∗TEST,a,EIM in terms of P
∗
TEST,a,O, with
P ∗TEST,a,EIM = θ
∗ P ∗TEST,a,O
and substitute this expression into equation (28), yielding
(33) P ∗TEST,a,EIM = θ
∗ P ∗TEST,a,O : ∆TEST,α
[
θ ~P ∗TEST,α,O
]
=
∆∗ − σTEST,β ∆
∗
TEST,β
σTEST,α
,
where ~P ∗TEST,α,O is the vector of the offer prices of the sample α IPOs. As above, we set
σTEST,α and σTEST,β equal to their sample values. Given that P
∗
TEST,b,EIM = P
∗
TEST,b,O for all
β IPOs, it follows that
(34) ∆∗TEST,β,EIM = ∆
∗
TEST,β,O =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
B
B∑
1
RTEST,b INEG
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where
INEG =


1, if R < 0;
0, if R ≥ 0.
The last term we need to estimate is ∆∗. If banks do set offer prices equal to fundamental
offer prices, then it follows that sample CONTROL IPO offer prices equal fundamental
offer prices and hence that ∆∗ = ∆∗CONTROL. Consequently, our point estimate of the
market level of downside risk is ∆∗POINT, with
(35) ∆∗POINT = ∆
∗
CONTROL,POINT =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
C
C∑
1
RCONTROL,c INEG
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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Consequently,
(36) ∆∗TEST,α,POINT =
∆∗CONTROL,POINT − σTEST,β,O∆
∗
TEST,β,O
σTEST,α,O
.
We then find our point estimate of ~P ∗TEST,α,EIM by numerically solving for θ
∗
POINT,
with
(37) θ∗POINT = θ :
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
A
A∑
1
V ∗TEST,a − θ P
∗
TEST,a,O
θ P ∗TEST,a,O
INEG
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ∆
∗
TEST,α,POINT.
It follows that
(38) R
∗
TEST,α,EIM,POINT =
1
A
A∑
1
V ∗TEST,a − θ
∗
POINT P
∗
TEST,a,O
θ∗POINT P
∗
TEST,a,O
and that
(39) R
∗
TEST,EIM,POINT = σ
∗
TEST,α,OR
∗
TEST,α,EIM,POINT + σ
∗
TEST,β,OR
∗
TEST,β,O.
To construct a confidence interval for our R
∗
TEST,EIM estimates, we use a bootstrap
consisting 10,000 trials. In each trial we:
• Draw a bootstrap trial ξ from our CONTROL sample;
• Calculate ∆CONTROL,ξ as in equation (35) using the bootstrap trial rather than the
original CONTROL sample;
• Compute R
∗
TEST,EIM,ξ using ∆CONTROL,ξ rather than ∆CONTROL,POINT.
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We operationalize our EIMH test (equation (30)) by measuring the Expected
Absolute Error (EAE) between our estimate of R
∗
TEST,EIM and R
∗
TEST,O, with
(40) EAETEST =
1
10, 000
10,000∑
ξ=1
∣∣∣R∗TEST,EIM,ξ −R∗TEST,O
∣∣∣ .
We accept the EIMH if
(41) EAETEST ≤ ǫ
∗.
Obviously, choosing an appropriate value for ǫ∗ is a matter of judgement (Black (1986)
defined an efficient market as “one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value”). And, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no alternative theory of IPO average initial returns that
provides quantitative predictions against which we can benchmark our analysis. Somewhat
arbitrarily, then, we set ǫ∗ at 5%.
We have implicitly assumed here that TEST and CONTROL portfolios each consist
of a single IPO type as we define an IPO type in our theoretical analysis. We show in the
appendix that this test also works when TEST and CONTROL portfolios consist of a
blend of pure types (as any IPO type that we can define empirically will inevitably be).
IV. The Sample and IPO Attributes
We start with a list of all US IPOs in the Thomson Reuters SDC database with
offer dates between 1/1/1999 and 12/31/2016. We include an IPO in the sample if:
• SDC provides a non-missing value for the IPO’s offer price, closing price, global
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proceeds, gross spread, and CUSIP;
• The IPO’s offer price is ≥ $5;
• The IPO’s global proceeds are ≥ $25 million (in $2009);
• The IPO’s gross spread is between 3% and 12% (inclusive);
• The IPO’s primary exchange is the NYSE, American, or Nasdaq;
• The underwriting bank’s pricing technique is reported as Bookbuilding and its
offering technique is reported as Firm Commitment/Negotiated Sale;
• The IPO consists of common shares;
• The issuer is not a Closed End Fund, a Trust, or a REIT; and
• The SDC offer date is within 10 days of the issuer’s first trading day on CRSP (we
match by Ticker).
Our sample consists of 1745 IPOs.
We set an IPO z’s initial return (Rz) equal to
Rz =
PCLOSE,z − POFFER,z
POFFER,z
,
where an IPO’s offer price is from SDC and its closing price is the closing price reported by
CRSP on its first trading day.
We limit the sample to IPOs with Global Proceeds of at least $25 million in order to
eliminate the possibility of our analysis being driven by extreme returns on very small
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IPOs. However, including IPOs with Global Proceeds of less than $25 million does not
materially alter any of our results.
We sort IPOs into types and isotypes on the basis of the following attributes:
• BOOM (B) or PBOOM (PB): An IPO with an offer date in 1999 or 2000 (between
1/1/2001 and 12/31/2016);
• TECH (T ) or NTECH (NT): An issuer that is (is not) in a Tech industry as
classified by SDC;
• HIGH PRESTIGE (HP) or LOW PRESTIGE (LP): An IPO whose lead underwriter
is a bank with with a prestige rating ≥ ( 6≥) 8.5 for our entire sample period (the HP
banks are Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Merrill
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley);17
• α or β: An IPO with an offer price within or above (below) its initial offer price range.
An IPO type is defined as a bundle of attributes, and an IPO is of a given type if it
has all of the attributes that define that type. So, for example, BOOM/TECH IPOs are
TECH IPOs with an offer date in 1999 or 2000. Each IPO type consists of an α and a β
isotype. We summarize our Sample selection criteria and IPO attribute definitions in Table
1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
17We take our underwriter prestige ratings from Jay Ritter’s website
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V. Testing the EIMH: Results
The principal challenge facing any theory of IPO average initial returns is to explain:
i) the extremely high R on Tech IPOs during the DotCom Boom; and ii) the substantial
time-series variation in the R of Tech and NonTech IPOs over the Boom and the PostBoom
period. We therefore examine the validity of the EIMH by using the method we devise in
Section III to see if the combination of the optimal IPO pricing rule we derive in Section II
and issuer fundamentals enables us to accurately and precisely predict the quantitative
magnitude of this cross-sectional and time-series variation in average initial returns.
To do so, we carry out two sets of tests. In the first set, we sort IPOs into types
that capture the cross-sectional and time-series variation in R on the basis of issuer/IPO
characteristics alone. In this set of tests we are implicitly assuming that underwriter
characteristics do not play a role in determining an IPO’s offer price. So, in the second set
of tests, we split each IPO type we define in the first set into two types on the basis of the
prestige of the IPO’s underwriter. Consider each set of tests in turn.
A. Issuer Fundamentals and Average Initial Returns
We begin by defining four TEST portfolios: BOOM/TECH (B/T), BOOM/NTECH
(B/NT), PBOOM/TECH (PB/T), and PBOOM/NTECH (PB/NT). We also create two
CONTROL portfolios: BOOM and PBOOM. We report summary statistics on these IPO
types and their associated α and β isotypes in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
We then estimate R
∗
TEST,EIM for each TEST portfolio. To do so, we estimate the
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market equilibrium level of downside risk for each cross-sectional TECH and NTECH pair
using a common CONTROL portfolio consisting of all IPOs from the other time period.
So, for example, we use the PBOOM portfolio as the CONTROL for our estimate of
R
∗
TEST,EIM for B/T and B/NT IPOs. Consequently, our estimate of R
∗
TEST,EIM for one
period’s TECH IPOs is completely independent of our estimate of R
∗
TEST,EIM for that
period’s NTECH IPOs.
Carrying out this analysis, we obtain the following results (summarized in Table 3):
• B/T: The observed R on B/T IPOs is 76.74%. We find that i) R
∗
B/T,EIM = 75.30%; ii)
the 95% confidence interval for R
∗
B/T,EIM is
{
72.30%, 79.14%
}
; and that iii) EAEB/T
= 1.90%;
• B/NT: The observed R on B/NT IPOs is 28.55%. We find that: i) R
∗
B/NT,EIM =
26.74%; ii) the 95% confidence interval for R
∗
B/NT,EIM is
{
25.71%, 27.74%
}
; and that
iii) EAEB/NT = 1.80%.
• PB/T: The observed R on PB/T IPOs is 17.07%. We find that: i) R
∗
PB/T,EIM =
20.92%; ii) the 95% confidence interval for R
∗
PB/T,EIM is
{
17.73%, 25.06%
}
; and that
iii) EAEPB/T = 3.85%;
• PB/NT: The observed R on PB/NT IPOs is 11.76%. We find that: i) R
∗
PB/NT,EIM =
10.97%; ii) the 95% confidence interval for R
∗
PB/NT,EIM is
{
9.45%, 13.10%
}
; and that
iii) EAEPB/NT = 1.01%.
In short, we find that the EIMH produces extremely accurate estimates of the magnitude
of the observed average initial return on both TECH and NTECH IPOs in both the
BOOM and PBOOM period. Furthermore, these R
∗
TEST,EIM estimates are very precise (as
one can see from the plots of their confidence intervals in Figure 1). Consequently, the
expected absolute error between R
∗
TEST,EIM and the observed average initial return on a
TEST portfolio falls below our 5% target for all four TEST portfolios.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
B. Underwriter Prestige and Average Initial Returns
In our theoretical analysis we assume that all banks use the same IPO pricing rule
in equilibrium despite a considerable body of empirical evidence suggesting that high
prestige banks use a different pricing rule than low prestige banks (see, for example, Carter
and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004)).
So, to explore the validity of this assumption, we split each IPO type we analyze above into
a HP and a LP variant TEST/PREST, PREST ∈ {HP,LP}, where TEST/PREST
contains all IPOs of that type underwritten by a bank with a prestige rating of PREST (as
defined in Section IV). We then estimate R
∗
TEST/PREST,EIM for each variant of each IPO
type separately as above.
We report summary statistics for each TEST/PREST porfolio in Table 3.
Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2004), we find that R
∗
TEST/HP,O > R
∗
TEST/LP,O for
each IPO type.
Our method of estimating R
∗
TEST/PREST,EIM assumes that banks are homogenous.
So, if the R differences we observe arise because high prestige banks use a pricing rule that
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results in greater underpricing (all else equal) than the pricing rule used by low prestige
banks, then we would expect to find that R
∗
TEST/HP,EIM < R
∗
TEST/HP,O and
R
∗
TEST/LP,EIM > R
∗
TEST/LP,O. If instead banks do provide a homogenous underwriting
service (implying that any differences in R arise from differences in issuer fundamentals
across HP and LP banks), then we would expect to find that
R
∗
TEST/PREST,EIM = R
∗
TEST/PREST,O for all IPO types.
We report the results of this analysis in Table 3 and plot the confidence intervals for
our R
∗
TEST/PREST,EIM estimates in Figure 2. As in our first set of tests, we find that
R
∗
TEST/HP,EIM provides an accurate and precise estimate of the empirical magnitude of
R
∗
TEST/PREST,O for all IPO types. To illustrate, we calculate that R
∗
EIM is 99.80% for
B/T/HP IPOs and 55.68% for B/T/LP IPOs. The observed R on these IPOs is 106.36%
and 54.14% respectively. These results therefore suggest that high prestige and low prestige
underwrites do use the same pricing rule.18
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
C. What Explains the Variation in IPO Average Initial Returns?
IPO average initial returns do vary tremendously along both time-series and
cross-sectional dimensions. Yet, the optimal IPO pricing rule that the EIMH produces
enables us to accurately and precisely predict the quantitative magnitude of this variation.
Consequently, these results imply that: i) banks do use the optimal IPO pricing rule that
18It is true that the EAE for B/T/HP IPOs of 6.57% is very slightly higher than the 5% threshold we
have chosen for accepting the EIMH. We therefore classify the B/T/HP case as a Borderline acceptance of
the EIMH.
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the EIMH yields; and that ii) the substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation we
observe in IPO average initial returns is driven by the combination of this pricing rule and
the cross-sectional and time-series variation in issuer fundamentals.
VI. Conclusion
The IPO market consists of sophisticated banks who intermediate between
sophisticated issuers on the one hand and sophisticated investors on the other in an
environment characterized by informational frictions. We conjecture that the sensible way
to model this market is to assume that it consists of fully rational optimizing agents.19 In
this case: i) banks will devise the optimal underwriting method given the informational
frictions that characterize the market; and ii) an IPO’s offer price will be determined
entirely by the combination of the pricing rule implied by that underwriting method and
issuer fundamentals. We label this conjecture the Efficient IPO Market Hypothesis
(EIMH), and we test the EIMH by seeing if banks do set offer prices in this manner.
Our analysis finds that block-booking is the optimal underwriting method and that
block-booking banks set offer prices such that the downside risk on an IPO given its
optimal offer price equals the market equilibrium level of downside risk. To calculate the
average initial return that this pricing rule implies for a portfolio of TEST IPOs, we first
estimate the market equilibrium level of downside risk using a completely independent
19That is, as Thaler (2016) would put it, we assume that all of the agents in our model are Econs. Thaler
(2016) argues in favor of rejecting the Efficient Markets Hypothesis itself on the grounds that models with
agents that behave as Econs are completely implausible as models of how markets actually function. The
success of our Econ-based model of the IPO market provides a counter-example to this critique.
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CONTROL portfolio. We then adjust TEST IPO offer prices by a scalar such that the
downside risk on the TEST portfolio given the scalar-adjusted offer prices equals the
market equilibrium level of downside risk. The average initial return on TEST IPOs in an
efficient market is then the average initial return on those IPOs with the scalar-adjusted
offer prices.
The biggest challenge for any IPO pricing theory—especially a rational optimizing
agent theory such as ours—is to explain the extremely high average initial return on Tech
IPOs during the DotCom Boom and the dramatic variation in Tech and NonTech IPO
underpricing over time. We therefore test the EIMH by seeing if the optimal pricing rule
our analysis yields enables us to accurately and precisely predict the quantitative
magnitude of this cross-sectional and time-series variation in average initial returns. We
find that it does. To illustrate: our analysis implies that the average initial return on Tech
IPOs during the DotCom Boom of 1999/2000 in an efficient market is 75.30%, while the
observed average initial return on these IPOs is 76.74%.
To the best of our knowledge, the EIMH we develop here (building upon
Gondat-Larralde and James (2008)) is the only theory that yields precise quantitative
predictions for the time-series and cross-sectional variation in IPO average initial returns.
The strong empirical support that we find for the predictions of this theory therefore
implies that banks do use the optimal underwriting method to take firms public and hence
that IPO offer prices (and so average initial returns) are determined entirely by issuer
fundamentals given the pricing rule implied by that underwriting method. This finding in
turn suggests that the agency conflict and/or behavioral factors that are the focus of much
of the post-DotCom Boom research on IPOs do not play any significant role in determining
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IPO offer prices.
We conclude that the IPO market is efficient.
Appendix
A. Proofs of the Propositions
Proposition 1: Within the constraints imposed by its choice of a valid underwriting
method, a bank maximizes the expected offer price (minimizes expected underpricing) of its
IPOs so as to maximize expected fees.
If the market is in equilibrium, then
(42) Ω∗ = S P + λ.
Solving for S using equation (42) and rewriting the bank’s market value (equation (2))
yields
(43) M =
∑
t
γt
1
QU
(
Ω∗ + P − V + (σY κY + σN κN) (V − P )
)
.
Taking the derivative of equation (43) with respect to P , we find that
(44)
∂πβ
∂P
=
∑
t
γt
1
QU
(1− σY κY − σN κN) > 0.
That is, a bank’s market value increases as the expected offer price on its IPOs increases
(holding the price of underwriting services constant).
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Proposition 5: A market equilibrium price of underwriting services exist.
We assume that the market is in a Nash equilbrium in which each bank j
simultaneously chooses a price of underwriting services ωj such that ωj = Ω
∗ for all j. To
solve for the equilibrium, we assume that all banks g, g 6= z, choose ω∗g = Ω
∗
CAN, where
Ω∗CAN is a candidate Ω
∗. Bank z can choose any ωz, with ωz = Ω
∗
CAN − ζ. Since bank
market values increase with Ω, Ω∗ will equal the highest value of Ω such that z chooses ζ
equal to 0.
Given that the variability of initial returns will make it difficult for an issuer to
detect differences in the cost of underwriting services across banks absent a great deal of
data, we assume that issuers begin with a prior that the market is in equilibrium and learn
each bank’s true cost of underwriting over time. To capture this intuition in a tractable
manner, we assume that z’s probability of winning a mandate in period t is a function of ζ
and t, with
φw,z,t =


1
QU
, if ζ = 0,
1
QU
, if t < tLONG,
φw,z,LONG [ζ] , if t ≥ tLONG and ζ > 0.
We assume that
∂φw,z,LONG
∂ζ
> 0 and
∂2φw,z,LONG
∂ζ2
< 0.
We further assume that tLONG and the investor discount parameter are such that Y
investors place essentially no weight on z’s higher market share after tLONG when deciding
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whether to lemon-dodge. In other words, z has to set offer prices assuming a market share
of Qu. Consequently, z can only lower its cost of underwriting services by lowering its gross
spread and not by increasing offer prices.
Bank z’s market value equals
(45)
Mz =
tLONG−1∑
1
γtu
1
Qu
πz [Ω
∗
CAN, ζ] +
∞∑
tLONG
γtu φw,z,LONG [ζ] πz [Ω
∗
CAN, ζ]
= ΓSHORT
1
Qu
πz [Ω
∗
CAN, ζ] + ΓLONG φw,z,LONG [ζ] πz [Ω
∗
CAN, ζ] ,
where the Γ terms represent the present discounted value multipliers. Obviously,
∂πz
∂ζ
= −1 and
∂πz
∂Ω∗CAN
> 0.
Taking the derivative of Mz wrt ζ, we find that
(46)
∂Mz
∂ζ
=
ΓSHORT
Qu
∂πz
∂ζ
+ ΓLONG
∂φw,z,LONG
∂ζ
πz + ΓLONG φw,z,LONG
∂πz
∂ζ
.
The first and third terms of equation (46) are less than 0, so ∂Mz/∂ζ < 0 for a sufficiently
low Ω∗CAN. Taking the derivative of ∂Mz/∂ζ shows that
(47)
∂2Mz
∂ ζ ∂ Ω∗CAN
= ΓLONG
∂φw,z,LONG
∂ζ
∂ πz
∂ Ω∗CAN
> 0.
It follows that there exists a unique maximum Ω∗CAN such that ζ = 0. This value of Ω is the
market equilibrium price of underwriting services Ω∗.
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B. Testing the EIMH with Blended Portfolios
Our test of the EIMH requires fairly large TEST and CONTROL portfolios as it
involves estimating the downside risk of an IPO type’s return distribution. In practice,
then, any IPO type that we use in our empirical analysis will be broad (for example, Tech
IPOs during the DotCom Boom) and will therefore inevitably consist of a blend of pure
IPO types as we define them in our theoretical analysis. So, we now briefly show that the
test we develop in Section III will work with blended TEST and CONTROL portfolios.
For simplicity, suppose that CONTROL IPOs consist of two pure types BC1 and
BC2 in unknown proportions µBC1 and µBC2 and that TEST IPOs also consist of two pure
types BT1 and BT2 in unkown proportions µBT1 and µBT2.
We estimate ∆∗ using CONTROL IPOs. If ∆∗BC1 = ∆
∗
BC2 = ∆
∗, then it is obvious
that
∆∗CONTROL,O = µBC1∆
∗
BC1 + µBC2∆
∗
BC2 = ∆
∗.
Hence, using a blended CONTROL sample to estimate the equilibrium level of downside
risk (equation (35)) does not pose any problems for our analysis.
Turning to TEST IPOs, there will be a θ∗ such that
(48) ∆∗ = µBT1∆BT1
[
θ∗ P ∗BT1,α,O
]
+ µBT2∆BT2
[
θ∗ P ∗BT2,α,O
]
,
where θ∗ is now the uniform swing needed in TEST IPO offer prices to equalize downside
risk across TEST and CONTROL IPOs (we drop β IPO offer prices from equation (48) as
they are fixed by the Pricing Constraint). We can therefore estimate θ∗ as above.
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If banks do block book then P ∗BT1,α,O = P
∗
BT1,α,EIM and P
∗
BT2,α,O = P
∗
BT2,α,EIM,
implying that R
∗
TEST,O = R
∗
TEST,EIM. In this case we will find that EAETEST is small and so
will (correctly) accept the EIMH. If, on the other hand, banks systematically set TEST
IPO offer prices below (or above) their fundamental offer prices, then we will find that
θ∗ 6= 1 and hence that R
∗
TEST,O 6= R
∗
TEST,EIM. In this case we will find that EAETEST is
large and so will (correctly) reject the EIMH. We therefore believe that our EIMH test will
enable us to detect any systematic deviation between observed offer prices and
fundamental offer prices even when the CONTROL and TEST IPO portfolios we use
consist of a blend of pure IPO types.
C. The MaxiMin Effect
In our theory: i) each IPO type consists of a low value β isotype and a high value α
isotype; ii) issuers have MaxiMin preferences; and iii) banks set offer prices to equalize
downside risk across IPO types (not isotypes). Banks therefore set β IPO offer prices at
their maximum feasible level and set α IPO offer prices at the level that brings about
downside risk equalization across IPO types. It follows that β IPO offer prices are higher
and α IPO offer prices are lower than they would be if banks set offer prices to equalize
downside risk across each isotype independently. We denote the gap between the observed
R on TEST/η IPOs and what that R would be if isotypes were priced independently
(R
∗
TEST,η,IND) as the MaxiMin Effect or MME, with
(49) MME∗TEST,η = R
∗
TEST,η,O −R
∗
TEST,η,IND.
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To gauge the magnitude of the MME, we first estimate R
∗
TEST,η,IND for each isotype
of the B/T, B/NT, PB/T, and PB/NT portfolios we define in Section V. To do so, we use
the method we devise in Section III to estimate R
∗
TEST,EIM (modified as needed to take
account of the fact that we carrying out this estimate for a single isotype), setting the
equilibrium level of downside risk for each isotype equal to the observed downside risk on
the appropriate CONTROL portfolio from Section V. We then use equation (49) to
compute the point estimate and confidence interval for MME∗TEST,η for each isotype. We
report these MME estimates in Table C.1.
We find that the MME is non-trivial for β IPOs during the Boom. The MME
pushes the R on B/T/β IPOs from 20.26% to its observed value of 5.71% and the R on
B/NT/β IPOs from 11.05% to its observed value of 0.77%. That said, we note that our
B/NT/β sample consists of only 13 IPOs, so obviously the observed R on these IPOs is a
very noisy estimate of its true value.
We also find that the MME is close to zero for α IPOs during the Boom and for all
IPOs in the PostBoom period. For example, the MME is only 4.22% for B/T/α IPOs and
−3.85% for PB/T/β IPOs.
One implication of this analyis is that, while MME effects are non-trivial in some
cases, the gap between R on α and β IPOs would be substantial even if each isotype were
priced independently. It follows that the within type cross-sectional variation in average
initial returns is mostly down to the variation in α and β IPO fundamentals rather than to
the MME effect.
This analysis also suggests that the MME did reduce issuer risk during the Boom by
substantially increasing an issuer’s offer price in the event of a poor project value
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Table C.1: The Magnitude of the MaxiMin Effect
Each IPO type consists of a low value β isotype (empirically: an IPO with its offer
price below its initial offer price range) and a high value α isotype (empirically: an
IPO with its offer price within or above its initial offer price range). Due to issuer
MaxiMin preferences, banks set the offer price on a β isotype at its maximum
feasible level and so set the offer price on an α isotype at the level required to
equalize downside risk across IPO types. Consequently, β IPO offer prices are
higher and α IPO offer prices are lower than they would be if banks set offer
prices independently for each isotype. We denote the gap between the observed
average initial return (R
∗
TEST,η,O) on TEST/η IPOs (η ∈ {α, β}) and what that
R would be if isotypes were priced independently (R
∗
TEST,η,IND) as the MaxiMin
Effect (MME), with MME∗TEST,η = R
∗
TEST,η,O−R
∗
TEST,η,IND. In this table we report
for each sample isotype: i) R
∗
TEST,η,O; ii) R
∗
TEST,η,IND; iii) MME
∗
TEST,η; and iv) the
95% confidence interval for MME∗TEST,η. See Table 1 for portfolio definitions and
Table 2 for summary statistics.
Isotype R
∗
TEST,η,O (%) R
∗
TEST,η,IND (%) MME (%) 95% CI
B/T/α 82.51 78.29 4.22 {1.63, 6.68}
B/T/β 5.71 20.26 -14.55 {−12.67,−16.36}
B/NT/α 32.39 29.11 3.28 {2.34, 4.23}
B/NT/β 0.77 11.05 −10.28 {−8.52,−11.95}
PB/T/α 20.90 23.33 -2.41 {−5.43, 0.12}
PB/T/β 4.21 8.06 −3.85 {−5.83,−2.13}
PB/NT/α 14.37 12.83 1.53 {0.00, 3.00}
PB/NT/β 3.05 4.35 −1.30 {−2.97, 0.10}
realization during the IPO process. Furthermore, since only a small proportion of projects
received a poor value realization during the Boom, this substantial MME boost to β offer
prices came at a cost of only a small MME reduction in α offer prices. Hence, our
assumption that issuers have MaxiMin preferences is not implausible.
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Table 1: Sample, IPO Attributes, and Variable Definitions
Starting with a list of all US IPOs in the Thomson Reuters SDC database with
offer dates between 1/1/1999 and 12/31/2016, we include an IPO in the sample if:
i) SDC provides a non-missing value for the IPO’s offer price, closing price, global
proceeds, gross spread, and CUSIP; ii) The IPO’s offer price is ≥ $5; iii) The IPO’s
global proceeds are ≥ $25 million (in $2009); iv) The IPO’s gross spread is between
3% and 12% (inclusive); v) The IPO’s primary exchange is the NYSE, American, or
Nasdaq; vi) The underwriting bank’s pricing technique is reported as Bookbuilding
and its offering technique is reported as Firm Commitment/Negotiated Sale; vii)
The IPO consists of common shares; viii) The issuer is not a Closed End Fund, a
Trust, or a REIT; and ix) The SDC offer date is within 10 days of the issuer’s first
trading day on CRSP (we match by Ticker). Our sample consists of 1745 IPOs. We
match underwriters with a prestige rating from Jay Ritter’s website. We sort IPOs
into types and isotypes on the basis of the following attributes:
Attribute/Variable Definition
BOOM (B) or PBOOM (PB): An IPO with an offer date during the DotCom
Boom of 1999/2000 (between 1/1/2001 and 12/31/2016);
TECH (T ) or NTECH (NT): The issuer is (is not) in a tech industry as classified by SDC;
HIGH PRESTIGE (HP) or LOW PRESTIGE (LP): An IPO whose lead underwritter is a bank with a prestige
rating ≥ ( 6≥) 8.5 for our entire sample period
(HP banks are: Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs,
J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley);
α or β: An IPO with a final offer price that is within or above (below)
its initial offer price range;
Global Proceeds: Global Proceeds (from SDC) in $2009 millions;
Initial Return: (PCLOSE − POFFER)/POFFER;
PCLOSE: An IPO firm’s closing price on its offer date (from CRSP);
POFFER: An IPO’s offer price (from SDC).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics On IPO Types
We sort IPOs into types and isotypes. An IPO type is defined as a bundle of attributes (see Table 1 for attribute
definitions), and an IPO is of a given type if it has all of the attributes that define that type. So, for example,
BOOM/TECH IPOs are TECH IPOs with an offer date in 1999 or 2000. Each IPO type consists of an α and a β isotype,
where α (β) IPOs are IPOs with an offer price within or above (below) their initial offer price range. For each IPO type
and isotype, we report: i) the number of IPOs of that type in our sample (Obs); ii) the observed average initial return
(R
∗
O); iii) the standard deviatiation of initial returns (StDev); and iv) mean global proceeds (GP) in $2009.
All α IPOs β IPOs
Type Obs R
∗
O (%) StDev GP Obs R
∗
O (%) StDev GP Obs R
∗
O (%) StDev GP
Sample 1745 33.46 63.67 193.11 1434 39.90 68.34 194.36 311 3.79 12.17 187.32
BOOM (B) 613 68.33 93.08 160.62 562 74.13 94.95 162.11 51 4.45 18.73 144.13
BOOM/TECH (B/T) 506 76.74 97.64 136.40 468 82.51 99.15 136.21 38 5.71 20.73 138.75
BOOM/TECH//HP (B/T/HP) 219 106.36 118.83 192.32 207 112.12 119.63 185.62 12 7.05 20.42 307.89
BOOM/TECH/LP (B/T/LP) 287 54.14 69.9 93.73 261 59.02 71.19 97.03 26 5.09 21.25 60.68
BOOM/NTECH (B/NT) 107 28.55 51.63 275.12 94 32.39 53.86 291.06 13 0.77 10.8 159.88
BOOM/NTECH/HP (B/NT/HP) 50 32.52 57.88 478.06 47 34.95 58.88 492.65 3 -5.54 5.66 249.53
BOOM/NTECH/LP (B/NT/LP) 57 25.06 45.69 97.1 47 29.82 48.82 89.47 10 2.66 11.45 132.99
PBOOM (PB) 1132 14.58 23.41 210.7 872 17.84 25.16 215.15 260 3.67 10.46 195.79
PBOOM/TECH (PB/T) 601 17.07 26.79 145.26 463 20.90 28.73 156.47 138 4.21 11.95 107.63
PBOOM/TECH/HP (PB/T/HP) 370 21.07 28.34 193.03 289 25.65 29.81 208.06 81 4.73 12.67 139.4
PBOOM/TECH/LP (PB/T/LP) 231 10.67 22.72 68.73 174 13.03 25.00 70.78 57 3.47 10.91 62.48
PBOOM/NTECH (PB/NT) 531 11.76 18.50 284.77 409 14.36 19.84 281.57 122 3.05 8.47 295.52
PBOOM/NTECH/HP (PB/NT/HP) 352 11.86 18.72 376.26 268 14.67 20.23 371.67 84 2.90 7.62 390.90
PBOOM/NTECH/LP (PB/NT/LP) 179 11.58 18.10 104.87 141 13.79 19.13 110.31 38 3.39 10.20 84.69
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Table 3: Average Initial Returns in an Efficient IPO Market
In an efficient IPO market a bank sets offer prices to equalize downside risk at the
market equilibrium level across IPO types (where an IPO’s downside risk equals
its expected return setting all positive return realizations to zero). To estimate
the average intial return on a TEST portfolio of IPOs in an efficient market, we
set the market equilibrium level of downside risk equal to the downside risk on an
independent CONTROL portfolio (estimated using a bootstrap). Then, we adjust
TEST IPO offer prices by a scalar such that the downside risk on TEST IPOs
given the scalar-adjusted offer prices equals the market equilibrium level of downside
risk. The average initial return on the TEST portfolio in an efficient IPO market is
then the average initial return computed with the scalar-adjusted offer prices. For
each TEST portfolio, we report: i) the CONTROL portfolio we use to estimate the
market equilibrium level of downside risk; ii) the observed average initial return on
that TEST portfolio (R
∗
TEST,O); iii) our point estimate of the average intial return
on TEST IPOs in an efficient IPO market (R
∗
TEST,EIM); iv) the 95% confidence
interval for R
∗
TEST,EIM; v) the expected absolute error (EAE) between our estimate
of R
∗
TEST,EIM and R
∗
TEST,O; and vi) whether or not we accept the Efficient IPO
Market Hypothesis (EIMH). We accept the EIMH if EAE ≤ 5%. See Table 1 for
IPO type definitions, Table 2 for summary statistics, and the text for details of the
method we use to estimate R
∗
TEST,EIM.
TEST CONTROL R
∗
TEST,O (%) R
∗
TEST,EIM (%) 95% CI EAE (%) Accept EIMH?
B/T PBOOM 76.74 75.30 {72.30, 79.14} 1.90 Accept
B/NT PBOOM 28.55 26.74 {25.71, 27.74} 1.80 Accept
PB/T BOOM 17.07 20.92 {17.73, 25.06} 3.85 Accept
PB/NT BOOM 11.76 10.97 {9.45, 13.10} 1.01 Accept
B/T/HP PBOOM 106.36 99.80 {95.91, 103.60} 6.57 Borderline
B/T/LP PBOOM 54.14 55.68 {52.42, 59.69} 1.95 Accept
B/NT/HP PBOOM 32.52 29.77 {28.83, 30.77} 2.75 Accept
B/NT/LP PBOOM 25.06 24.12 {23.06, 25.38} 0.98 Accept
PB/T/HP BOOM 21.07 24.78 {21.17, 30.07} 3.73 Accept
PB/T/LP BOOM 10.67 14.50 {11.96, 17.57} 3.85 Accept
PB/NT/HP BOOM 11.86 11.15 {9.48, 13.46} 1.01 Accept
PB/NT/LP BOOM 11.58 10.64 {9.22, 12.39} 1.05 Accept
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Figure 1: Average Initial Returns in an Efficient IPO Market
We sort sample IPOs into four TEST portfolios and we plot each portfolio’s
observed average initial return and the distribution of our estimate of that average
initial return in an efficient IPO market (R
∗
TEST,EIM). Our TEST portfolios are:
BOOM/TECH (B/T); BOOM/NTECH (B/NT); PBOOM/TECH (PB/T); and
PBOOM/NTECH (PB/NT). See Table 2 for summary statistics on each IPO type
and Table 3 for a description of how we calculate average initial returns in an
efficient IPO market. The observed average initial return for each TEST portfolio
is indicated by the dashed horizontal line and the solid horizontal lines indicate the
95% confidence interval of our R
∗
TEST,EIM estimate.
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Figure 2: Underwriter Prestige, Issuer Funamentals, and Average Initial Returns
We divide each IPO type in Table 1 into a HP and a LP variant, with the HP (LP)
variant consiting of all IPOs of that type underwritten by a HIGH PRESTIGE
(LOW PRESTIGE) bank. We plot the observed average initial return and the
distribuiton of our estimate of the average initial return in an efficient IPO market
implied by issuer fundamentals alone (R
∗
TEST,EIM) for each variant. See Table 2
for summary statistics on each IPO type and Table 3 for a description of how we
calculate R
∗
TEST,EIM. The observed average initial return for each TEST portfolio
is indicated by the dashed horizontal line and the solid horizontal lines indicate the
95% confidence interval of our R
∗
TEST,EIM estimate.
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